Interview with Theresa Reinold

Preparing managers for a world where economics and geopolitics are one

Geopolitics has long been regarded as a discipline for diplomats, the military or international relations specialists. Why is it now essential to teach it in a business school?

Some twenty years ago, when I was a student at the Wharton School in the United States, I was already taking courses in geopolitics and Global Strategic Management. American business schools therefore grasped the importance of these issues quite early on. In France, their integration into business school curricula seems more recent, driven in particular by the crises of recent years.

And yet this should have been addressed sooner. If we want to train future leaders and managers, it is essential that they understand the parameters of the world in which they will operate. You cannot run a company today without understanding its geopolitical environment, because that environment has a direct impact on its business and its performance.

The war in Ukraine demonstrated this in a particularly brutal way, with many European companies forced to reconsider their presence in Russia. We also see it in other crises, notably in the Middle East, which directly affect companies in logistics, transport and energy. It is an illusion to think that the economic sphere and the geopolitical sphere are separate. On the contrary, they are closely intertwined. Recent crises have forcefully reminded us of this.

And what specific features should the teaching of geopolitics have in a business school?

The teaching has to be different from what one might offer in a law faculty or an institute of political studies. When I teach in those institutions, I devote more time to international relations theory and to conceptual debates.

In a business school, the approach must be far more practical. Students need to be shown why geopolitics matters for their future careers and be able to understand, in concrete terms, the intersection between the world of business and the world of politics. So I try to work from case studies, recent articles and real-life situations. The aim is to make the subject tangible and turn it into a genuine tool for future managers. This is essential: if students do not understand how this teaching can be useful to them, you quickly risk losing them.

Large technology companies now occupy a growing place in international power relations, to the point that you describe some of them as "quasi-sovereign" actors. Is this situation truly unprecedented, or can we find companies in history that wielded comparable power?

One should always be cautious when presenting a phenomenon as completely new or "unprecedented". Very few things in human history truly are.

One obviously thinks of the British East India Company, which held considerable powers. It had its own army, minted currency and administered territories. From that point of view, today's Big Tech companies clearly do not hold comparable prerogatives, which traditionally remain those of the sovereign state.

What does strike me as remarkable today, however, is the extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of a few technology companies. Added to this, particularly in the United States, is a very close personal and institutional proximity between certain Silicon Valley leaders and political power, whether the White House or the Pentagon. This issue will become all the more important as digital infrastructure has now become vital infrastructure. With artificial intelligence today, and potentially quantum technologies tomorrow, this trend could accelerate further. Those who control this infrastructure hold immense power. Once the state no longer controls it itself, this inevitably raises the question of its sovereignty.

Where do you draw the line between a company that is simply very powerful and one that genuinely exercises a form of sovereignty?

Conceptual precision is fundamental here. We must avoid using the term sovereignty to describe any form of economic power. A powerful company has substantial resources that allow it, for example, to influence political debate or decision-making. Many companies fit this definition.

To be "quasi-sovereign", a company must exercise monopolistic or oligopolistic control over a vital infrastructure, and that infrastructure must be indispensable to the state's own ability to exercise its sovereignty. It should be noted that such control is often facilitated by the close proximity between business leaders and political power.

This is therefore a very narrow category. Siemens, for example, is an extremely powerful company, but I would not describe it as quasi-sovereign. Still in Europe, ASML is an interesting case. The company holds an absolutely central position in manufacturing the machines needed to produce semiconductors. It therefore comes close to meeting some of these criteria. But it lacks another dimension that is observed more in the United States: this very strong intertwining between technology company leaders and political structures.

How do you view the relationship between American Big Tech and American political power?

I take a rather critical view of this development, particularly from a democratic standpoint. The question is who influences whom. Is it still the government that regulates Big Tech, or are these companies managing to steer certain public policies in line with their interests?

I think it is above all a symbiotic relationship. The interests of both parties can converge. We see this notably in trade debates and in the pressure exerted by the American administration on its partners to defend the interests of American technology companies. What also strikes me is the very close personal proximity between certain Silicon Valley leaders and political power. Some public anecdotes reveal a form of intimacy between these two worlds. On their own, of course, they are not enough to demonstrate a general phenomenon, but they illustrate a much deeper rapprochement. The risk, then, is a growing confusion between private interests and the public interest. When personal, economic and political ties become this close, it becomes harder to determine where the interests of the private sector end and where the general interest that public institutions are supposed to represent begins. Some observers go as far as speaking of "state capture" by technology interests. I would not go that far, but I do believe there are several worrying indicators.

We should nevertheless avoid regarding Big Tech leaders as a homogeneous bloc. They do not all share the same ideology or the same political project. Some, however, display ambitions that very clearly go beyond the mere economic success of their company. Among several Silicon Valley figures, we find in particular a very strong desire for deregulation and a conception of freedom that gives considerable room to the market and to companies, sometimes at the expense of the constraints arising from democratic procedures.

The European Commission has made economic security a priority of its 2024-2029 programme. How do you view the European Union as a geopolitical actor in its relationship with Big Tech?

The European situation is complex. On the one hand, I believe that regulating Big Tech is necessary. But there is an often-used phrase: "The US innovates and Europe regulates." It captures quite well one of the difficulties we face. The European Union has an immense market, which gives it real regulatory power. But regulating is not enough. We also need to innovate, and that is where Europe currently suffers from a significant deficit. The Draghi report notably stressed this need.

If we look at the current race for artificial intelligence, Europe plays a marginal role compared with the United States and China. In many debates, it no longer even appears as one of the main players in the competition. This worries me, particularly in the current context. It would obviously be unrealistic to aim to become the world leader in every technology sector: artificial intelligence, cloud, satellites, semiconductors, etc. The challenge is rather to become strategically and selectively indispensable.

ASML is a good example of this. An unavoidable position in a few critical sectors can become a real bargaining lever vis-à-vis the United States or China. Europe does not yet have enough of these points of strategic indispensability. In my view, this is an important condition of its strategic autonomy. I actually prefer this expression to "digital sovereignty", which is often used too broadly. Sovereignty refers to a particularly strong form of control. Yet in public debate, the expression "digital sovereignty" is frequently used to describe situations that are more a matter of autonomy, resilience or capacity for control.

Is there currently a geopolitical trend, actor or phenomenon that you feel is underestimated, or even poorly covered, in public and media debate?

The quantum revolution. We talk a great deal about artificial intelligence, its opportunities and its risks, and that is of course an essential discussion. But attention is a scarce resource: by focusing almost exclusively on AI, we risk underestimating other major technological transformations.

I have just launched a research project on the geopolitical consequences of the quantum revolution. The technology is not yet mature enough to produce all the effects some experts anticipate. We do not yet have sufficiently powerful quantum computers. But this could change in the coming years or over the next decade.

The potential consequences are considerable, particularly in cryptography and data protection. If sufficiently powerful quantum computers one day make it possible to break certain encryption systems widely used today, the implications for defence, finance, companies and states will be major. We would enter an environment in which some of the mechanisms that currently protect secrets and sensitive information would become vulnerable.

If this subject remains relatively absent from public debate, it is probably because its consequences are not yet tangible. That is quite human: we tend to become fully aware of a phenomenon only when its effects begin to materialise. For now, quantum remains more of a subject for specialists and laboratories, but it should also be noted that more and more countries are adopting a national quantum strategy and regard quantum as an essential geopolitical lever.

My research project seeks precisely to understand how this revolution could transform international relations. Which actors will be most affected? How will it change foreign policies and power relations? Will it intensify existing conflicts or, on the contrary, create new incentives for international cooperation? I do not yet have definitive answers to these questions, since the project is just beginning, but I am convinced that the geopolitical consequences will be significant.

For someone wishing to discover or deepen their knowledge of geopolitics, which books, films, documentaries, podcasts or authors would you recommend?

I would recommend two books that greatly influenced my path: A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, by Samantha Power, and Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, by General Roméo Dallaire. Both books offer a way to reflect on the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 and, above all, on the reaction, or lack of reaction, of the international community. They teach us a great deal about how geopolitics works in practice: why do some crises attract enormous attention and resources, while others, despite devastating human consequences, remain relatively ignored? What role does media coverage play? And how does that attention in turn influence the political will to act?

Roméo Dallaire commanded the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda at the time of the genocide. His testimony helps us understand what the powerlessness of an international force means in concrete terms when it has neither the mandate nor the means needed to intervene. Samantha Power, who was a journalist before holding various diplomatic and political posts, vividly describes the decision-making mechanisms and internal debates in the United States in the face of the genocides of the 20th century. These books help us understand how governments can decide not to intervene in the face of mass atrocities.

This may seem a rather bleak way to conclude, but I also see a more optimistic message in it. In a democracy, citizens have the capacity to act. Public and media attention influences the political cost of inaction. When a crisis remains absent from the media and public debate, governments have little incentive to act. Conversely, when citizens inform themselves, challenge their political leaders, demonstrate or help put an issue on the agenda, they can exert real pressure.

This is also what I try to pass on to my students. Geopolitics can sometimes give a rather bleak view of the world, but it must not lead to fatalism. Citizens are not merely spectators of international relations; they too have the capacity to act.