Interview with Thibaut Joltreau

Understanding the world to decide better: geopolitics in service of corporate strategy

Geopolitics has long been considered a discipline for diplomats, military officers, or international relations specialists. Why is it now essential to teach it in a business school?

The relevance of geopolitics in business schools is often presented as a direct consequence of the return of conflicts, power rivalries, or the questioning of globalization. I share this observation, but I would like to nuance it. Geopolitics has always been essential to understanding the global economy.

During the 1990s and 2000s, at the peak of what was called "happy globalization," many believed that economic integration would naturally lead to the pacification of international relations. This vision was rooted in Montesquieu's theory of "gentle commerce," according to which the more states trade, the less they go to war. But globalization was never a natural phenomenon. It is a profoundly political construction. If international trade intensified, it is because states built an international order, created institutions, and established rules favoring the development of multinational corporations and global value chains. And what was built politically can also be challenged politically.

Current tensions between the United States and China remind us of this. More than a "return" of power dynamics, we are witnessing their reaffirmation. They never disappeared; they were simply less visible in a context of uncontested American hegemony. Teaching geopolitics in a business school therefore involves understanding periods of stability as much as periods of crisis.

What is the specificity of teaching geopolitics in a business school? What is your method?

The specificity lies first in the perspective adopted: that of the company. I then organize my teaching around three main pillars.

The first consists of understanding the major geopolitical dynamics that structure the contemporary world (the US-China rivalry, transformations of globalization, energy or technological issues, etc.). The second focuses on the concrete consequences of these phenomena for companies, their supply chains, markets, investments, reputation, or location strategies. Geopolitics is no longer simply general knowledge but a genuine analytical tool. Finally, the third pillar, which seems essential to me today, consists of considering companies as geopolitical actors in their own right. Major digital platforms, tech giants, or companies like SpaceX now directly influence international power relations. They have resources, technological capabilities, and sometimes an influence comparable to that of certain states. This rise in power also implies a growing geopolitical responsibility for companies. The Lafarge case, for example, illustrates that decisions made in conflict zones can have major legal, political, and ethical consequences.

Pedagogically, I favor a very practical approach, based on case studies. The goal is to help students understand how a geopolitical event translates into strategic decisions for a company: the trade wars between the United States and China, or industrial diversification strategies such as "China Plus One"—that is, reducing excessive dependence on a single country (in this case China) by relocating part of production to other states, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Finally, I place great importance on maps. The spatial dimension remains at the heart of geopolitics and is a powerful pedagogical tool for understanding trade routes, resources, strategic straits, or new technological rivalries.

Among your current research, you are particularly interested in the potential geopolitical lever that a circular economy could represent for Europe. Can you tell us more?

The circular economy is often approached from the angle of ecological transition. Yet it is also a major issue of economic sovereignty. My research focuses in particular on electric battery value chains. They perfectly illustrate a contemporary reality: our economies have become extremely interdependent. This interdependence creates vulnerabilities that certain states can turn into levers of power. China offers the most striking example. For several decades, it has invested massively in critical raw materials and, above all, in their processing. Today, it controls a very large share of global refining of lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths—resources essential to the energy transition. This is well known and documented.

In this context, developing recycling capacities could help reduce certain strategic dependencies. Recycling batteries means recovering resources already present on the territory rather than depending on external suppliers. The circular economy thus becomes an instrument of industrial resilience. The real question now concerns the conditions for its deployment: how can the necessary investments be financed? How can a still-emerging market be supported? These are precisely the questions my current work addresses.

The European Commission has made economic security a priority of its 2024-2029 program. How do you view the European Union as a geopolitical actor? Does it have the means to match its ambitions?

The European Union has long embodied confidence in the virtues of free trade and economic integration. Unlike the United States or China, it has relatively little developed genuine industrial policies and has favored commercial openness. But the context has changed. Strategic dependencies, trade tensions, and power rivalries have led the Union to place economic sovereignty back at the center of its agenda. In this sense, there is indeed a European awakening.

The difficulty, however, lies in the very nature of the Union. It remains an organization made up of twenty-seven states with sometimes divergent interests. This fragmentation limits its ability to act quickly on industrial, technological, or defense issues. For my part, I remain convinced that the answers to current challenges will come through greater European cooperation, not a return to purely national sovereignties. Airbus's successes show that joint industrial projects are possible. The challenge now is to replicate this type of cooperation in other strategic sectors.

Is there a geopolitical phenomenon today that you feel is underestimated in public debate?

In my view, it is undoubtedly climate change. Migration, resource tensions, agricultural transformations, and new territorial vulnerabilities will profoundly reshape power dynamics over the coming decades. Yet the resurgence of security concerns today tends to push climate policies to the background. I consider this opposition to be a strategic mistake. Issues of economic sovereignty and ecological transition can, on the contrary, be thought of together. The European Union also has a genuine lever of influence through what is sometimes called the "Brussels effect": its ability to spread its environmental standards globally thanks to the size of its market. Preserving this capacity is, in my view, as much a geopolitical issue as an economic one.

What do you think will be the major geopolitical trends of the coming century?

Three dynamics seem to me likely to shape the 21st century in a lasting way.

The first is the rivalry between the United States and China. In my view, it is the central geopolitical phenomenon of our era. My analysis is influenced by the school of international relations known as hegemonic studies, which focuses on cycles of power and transformations of the international order. Part of this body of work rests on the idea that an international system is relatively stable when there is a dominant power capable of defining its rules. Major periods of tension arise when this position is challenged by a rising new actor. This is precisely the situation we are observing today. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has held a hegemonic position within the international system. It has largely contributed to defining the institutions, norms, and rules that have structured contemporary globalization. Yet China's rise is progressively challenging this balance. Beyond theoretical debates on the stability of international systems, one observation stands out: power dynamics are coming back to the forefront. This rivalry manifests itself in trade, technology, supply chains, infrastructure, space, artificial intelligence, and even the setting of international standards. Behind each of these issues lies a fundamental question: who will write the rules of tomorrow's world? It is from this perspective that I also interpret the Trump phenomenon. Beyond the personality of the American president, his political action can be read as the expression of the anxieties of a hegemonic power confronted with its relative decline. The questioning of traditional alliances, protectionist policies, trade wars, and the desire to renegotiate America's international commitments all reflect a power seeking to preserve its dominant position in an increasingly competitive environment. From this point of view, Donald Trump appears as the political embodiment of a particular historical moment: one in which the hegemon must face the emergence of a challenger capable of contesting some of the very rules it helped establish.

The second major trend, which we have already discussed, is the geopolitical dimension of climate change. Its consequences will not be limited to environmental issues: they will affect migration, resources, infrastructure, economic models, and geopolitical balances. Climate-related tensions are likely to be among the main sources of instability in the coming decades.

Finally, demographic transition will constitute a third structural factor. Differences in population growth, the aging of certain societies, and the dynamism of other regions of the world will gradually reshape global economic and strategic balances.

These three phenomena will interact closely and redefine power dynamics for decades to come.

Do you think it would be relevant to create a "Chief Geopolitical Officer" position within companies?

There is probably no single answer. Needs differ depending on the sector, the value chain, and the degree of international exposure of companies. Some industries are naturally far more sensitive to geopolitical risks than others. My conviction, however, is that geopolitics cannot be confined to a single, isolated function. It must permeate the entire company: strategy, procurement, finance, operations, and risk management.

In large international groups, this expertise often already exists within risk or strategy departments. The question may be less about creating a new title than about better integrating a geopolitical culture into decision-making processes.

For someone wishing to discover or deepen their understanding of geopolitics, what books or works would you recommend?

Rather than recommending only academic works, I like to point students toward fiction.

Science fiction is a wonderful laboratory for reflecting on power dynamics, the dilemmas of cooperation, international crises, or technological transformations. I'm thinking in particular of The Three-Body Problem by Liu Cixin. Behind its science-fiction plot lies a fascinating reflection on international cooperation, deterrence, strategy, and human nature in the face of an existential threat.

On the film side, I recommend House of Dynamite. The film depicts a nuclear crisis and shows, with great realism, the decision-making mechanisms at play under strategic uncertainty. It reminds us that nuclear deterrence, sometimes thought to belong to the past, remains a profoundly current issue.

Geopolitics is not only about analyzing the present; it also invites us to imagine possible futures. That is precisely what these works allow us to do.