Interview with Jean-Vincent Holeindre

Commerce and War Are Not Mutually Exclusive: Rethinking Business Strategy in the Age of Great Geopolitical Recompositions

You are a board member of the EDHEC Chair in Geopolitics and Business Strategy. Why did you accept this role, and why do you think developing this kind of structure within a business school is relevant?

The approach strikes me as particularly relevant, as it runs counter to our tendency to compartmentalise academic knowledge. There are at least two major reasons that justify bringing business schools and geopolitics closer together: the evolution of the scientific landscape, on the one hand, and that of the geopolitical landscape, on the other.

With regard to the scientific landscape, there is today virtually no research project or teaching programme that does not rest on a cross-cutting and transdisciplinary approach. Geopolitics and international relations fit squarely within this logic of transversality.

From a geopolitical standpoint, we are witnessing a growing interpenetration of spheres of action. I would add that for a long time, we Europeans and Westerners lived with the idea that commerce would replace war, and that economics — understood as the science of exchange — constituted the primary, if not the sole, framework for interpreting international relations. This vision took shape in the context of the "peace dividend" and the "end of history."

Yet, as Péguy said, one must "see what one sees": commerce does not replace war, and war does not replace commerce. The two combine. This is well understood by certain major powers such as China and Russia, which, in their strategic doctrines, present an integrated vision of power dynamics. When war ends, it continues in other forms. By contrast, Europeans long structured their understanding of the world through a liberal lens, one built on separations: between commerce and war, between public and private, between state and society. This logic is reflected in the way our elites are trained.

To this picture we must add a massive phenomenon: the diversification of the global stage — what Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts called, in the 1990s, the "world turned upside down" — marked by the growing weight of economic and social actors, and in particular private actors. Since these actors play an increasingly influential role in geopolitical dynamics, it is logical that the institutions that train them should prepare them for these challenges.

What place is there for Europe and its actors in this "upturned world"?

Until now, Western powers set the pace and others adapted. This configuration has evolved and in some respects been reversed. It is now for us to adapt. This does not necessarily reflect an international decline, but it does require thinking even more in strategic terms — strategy being precisely the science of the other, of adapting to the other. It falls to us to have the humility to recognise that the world can in part be shaped without us.

As for the European Union, it was conceived above all as a peace project. The EU has asserted itself through norms rather than force. By contrast, the major contemporary powers — China, the United States, Russia — are developing strategies based on power dynamics, or even on forms of predation in which economics serves as the armed wing. A European objective could be to combine the EU's DNA — namely the law of peace — with a law of force grounded not in a desire for conquest, but in the strong and avowed ambition to defend a liberal model.

Furthermore, France has long championed the idea of a "powerful Europe," in contrast to a more liberal vision carried notably by the United Kingdom. Today, several of our partners recognise the relevance of this approach. But significant difficulties remain. The EU must first contend with its own internal tensions, in particular the rise of Eurosceptic currents. Another major challenge is that of leadership. When the idea of a powerful Europe is advanced from Paris, it is often perceived as an attempt to "make France great" through Europe. This perception must be overcome. If France wishes for a geopolitically strong Union, it must accept fully binding its destiny to that of the other European nations — and ultimately sharing this sovereign ambition at the continental scale. The current debates, notably around extended deterrence, will be structuring in this regard. The balance will be delicate to strike: France will need to adapt its positioning, while its partners will need to acknowledge its precedence on certain issues, particularly in nuclear matters.

Failing such an evolution, there is a real risk of Europe becoming even more vulnerable in the face of the predatory strategies of other powers.

Has this awareness taken hold at the level of companies?

I believe so — and even beyond companies, across society as a whole. One interesting indicator is the place geopolitics has come to occupy in secondary education, notably through the reform of the baccalauréat. The subject is generating genuine enthusiasm among secondary school students, a sign both of anxiety about the contemporary world and of a desire to better understand its dynamics.

On the corporate side, there has been significant growth in continuing education on these issues. There has also been a genuine cognitive revolution in the field of competitive intelligence. For a long time, our liberal mindset prevented us from perceiving the degree of hostility or strategic competition from certain foreign economic actors. Today, under the impetus of the state and of firms, a form of catch-up is underway. Progress has been made, notably in the protection of industrial secrets and sovereignty, even if room for improvement remains. This heightened vigilance could intensify further should the international context harden. These developments make me reasonably optimistic about the level of awareness in our societies — as I am about their capacity for progress, an idea deeply rooted in the European intellectual heritage, particularly that of the Enlightenment.

What do you think of the possibility of creating Chief Geopolitical Officer positions within companies?

Having myself followed a path combining business school and international relations, I have always been struck by how rarely this type of role is found in practice. Yet it seems obvious to me that such functions are destined to develop. That said, the goal is not to create an isolated or compartmentalised function. By nature, these issues are cross-cutting. The objective is rather to establish a point of strategic vigilance and intelligence at the "general staff" level of companies.

The very term "strategy" is telling. This word is common to both the business world and geopolitics. It expresses the necessity for all strategists to consider both the surrounding environment and the temporality of action. The market, like the battlefield, confronts us with uncertainty in the face of which decisions must be made. This uncertainty calls, on the one hand, for short-term adaptation and, on the other, for anticipation, foresight, and the capacity to envisage multiple scenarios over the long term. The challenge is not to predict the future, but to accept the possibility of surprise and to prepare for it. Attributing a form of omniscience to geopolitics would be a mistake. Its role is not to eliminate surprise, but to attenuate its effects by enabling organisations to be alerted and prepared.

In summary: yes to the development of geopolitical functions within companies, but on the condition that they permeate the entire organisation — without becoming a totem or an isolated expertise without counterpoint.

Speaking of anticipation, what do you see as the major geopolitical trends of the century ahead?

The first trend is that of regionalisation. France, for example, can no longer think of itself independently of the European scale.

But beyond this spatial dimension, the major challenge lies in the evolution of mental frameworks — what geographers call mental maps. One of the key strategic challenges concerns what is often referred to — somewhat imprecisely — as hybrid warfare. The psychological and cognitive dimensions now play a determining role in globalised conflict. Even when armed conflicts cease, other forms of confrontation persist. Certain powers have long integrated this continuity into their strategic thinking. For their part, European armies have in recent years been rediscovering the importance of cunning and indirect manoeuvre — the importance of "winning the war before the war." Geopolitics thus tends to extend across all spheres of action. This evolution carries risks — that of permanent conflict — but also opportunities, by encouraging us to become more enlightened and more aware citizens of the world's dynamics.

What reading, podcasts, or videos would you recommend for better understanding these dynamics?

I tend to recommend the classics first — it is essential to return to the fundamentals during periods of profound change. To understand contemporary geopolitics in the light of history, Raymond Aron's Memoirs make an excellent entry point. They offer an immersive journey through the twentieth century, seen through the eyes of a major observer of international relations.

For a video format, I recommend the programme Le Dessous des Cartes — a highly educational format, both accessible and demanding, which allows a wide range of subjects to be approached in a clear and synthetic manner.

Finally, I believe it is essential to read a specialist journal regularly. The journal format has the advantage of offering overall coherence — a kind of temporal and intellectual common thread given by the editorial line. Personally, I recommend Questions internationales, published by the Documentation française, which offers a structured and coherent analysis of the major contemporary geopolitical issues.