Interview with Xavier Hürstel

Interview with Xavier Hürstel, President of ADP International

You are a board member of the EDHEC Chair in Geopolitics and Business Strategy. Why did you accept this role, and why do you think developing this kind of structure within a business school is relevant?

It is important that French business schools continue to be competitive on the international stage. And to do that, they need to offer something that cannot be found elsewhere.

That added value can lie in the ability to open students up to geopolitical issues, provided it is done rigorously. That means going beyond the classic university teaching — which is excellent in its own right — found in preparatory classes or at Sciences Po, or beyond what one finds in the media, which can also deliver entirely relevant analyses. It requires being more pragmatic and less generalist, starting from real business situations where companies face concrete political, regulatory, or security constraints.

The other reason why students need to understand geopolitics is that large international groups play a very significant role in the French economy — more so than in other European Union countries. The geopolitical dimension is therefore essential to their development and the defence of their interests.

You are the international director of ADP. Is an international airport today a critical infrastructure comparable to a port or an energy network?

It is a critical infrastructure at least comparable to a port or an energy network. An international airport is a sovereign asset that states hold in particularly high regard, but also a permanent window onto the world on a daily basis. Of course, an energy network has an impact on everyday life, but one can imagine substitute energy sources. There are not many substitutes for air travel in many countries, particularly for international passenger flows and certain time-sensitive value chains. Moreover, air transport has a very high sensitivity to immediacy that is not necessarily found in ports. It is therefore an infrastructure that is at least comparable, with particular characteristics: a low capacity for substitution and an immediate impact capacity.

Are companies becoming fully-fledged diplomatic actors? How is the relationship between a group like ADP and the French state structured in a context of international tensions?

It seems to me a commonplace to say that companies are becoming diplomatic vectors. Business has always been tied to international relations. The history of the Republic of Venice is a very good illustration: a merchant republic that was nonetheless the first state with which France maintained diplomatic relations. So no, this is not new. Secondly, companies defend their interests and states defend theirs. When interests are aligned, there are common approaches. When they diverge, approaches differ. I am not sure, for example, that the medium-term strategies of French companies in Russia are always the same as those of the French state. But every case is different and it has always been this way. What is changing today is not the nature of the phenomenon, but its intensity — notably because companies have increasingly globalised activities — and its media exposure.

The particularity of Aéroports de Paris is that it is a company listed on the stock exchange at 49%, but majority-owned by the state at 51%. One might therefore be tempted to believe that ADP is an instrument of French diplomacy. That is not the case. The separation of powers means that the state as ADP's shareholder must act, under company law, in the best interests of the company. Thus, the state shareholder cannot force ADP to pursue international development initiatives that would not be in its corporate interest. Conversely, ADP cannot ask the French state for preferential support over other French competitors in certain international activities.

Do you see a particular singularity in the state-company relationship within liberal democracies?

Yes and no. It is the 80/20 rule: 80% of the time, it holds true. In the remaining 20%, you have Chinese or Russian companies that simply want to do business independently of their state. And you also have American companies that are very clearly instruments of American policy. So it is often true, but not always.

ADP is a company that attaches great importance to the sovereignty of the platforms it manages. Our strategy is to be Turkish in Turkey, Indian in India, French in France — in other words, to embed ourselves fully in local ecosystems. When we defend the French aeronautical sector, we do so because it is in our corporate interest, not because we are following instructions. Air France is our largest client, so its good health is in our interest. Likewise, Airbus's success feeds the airlines. So Airbus's performance is also in ADP's interest. But ADP can sometimes hold positions at odds with those of the French state, whether on fiscal measures or diplomatic policies that may have a negative impact on the group's operations.

Are there geopolitical chokepoints in air transport comparable to those we observe in maritime transport? Do the recent crises in the Gulf compel you to evolve your strategy?

Aviation is primarily a means of transporting people. It is therefore highly dependent on two factors: economic and demographic growth. Wars and epidemics are among the main constraints on that growth. Conflicts can close airspaces or force aircraft to alter their trajectories, as we have seen recently with the rerouting around certain areas in the Middle East or Eastern Europe. More indirectly, conflicts induce an economic and tourism slowdown. The real "chokepoints" in aviation are therefore the security of airspace and the freedom of movement of people. Covid demonstrated how massively these factors can impact the sector, with international traffic coming to a near-total halt within a matter of weeks.

As for the recent tensions in the Gulf, they have not altered ADP's strategy, because our strategy already factored in this geopolitical risk. The group is exposed to various sensitive zones, and its model incorporates this uncertainty, just as it does climatic or cyber risks, for example. Geopolitics is omnipresent in the sector, and every crisis is anticipated in medium-term strategies. The priority remains passenger safety.

How does a group like ADP anticipate the demographic challenges of the 21st century?

As I said, air transport rests on two variables: demographics and wealth. Traffic forecasts are therefore central, and they are built on projections of population growth and the expansion of the middle classes. The markets of the future are primarily in Asia and the Americas, where demographic growth is accompanied by rising prosperity.

Do you think it is relevant to create a position of Chief Geopolitical Officer?

It is a debate comparable to the one there has been around innovation. Should the function be centralised or distributed? There is no universal answer. In some companies, geopolitics must be integrated at every level. In others, a dedicated structure may be relevant, or alternatively an outsourcing of this monitoring function. The essential question is that of added value. A function that does nothing more than produce press summaries is of no interest. A pragmatic approach, tailored to the culture and needs of each company, is to be preferred. At ADP, senior leaders deal with geopolitics morning, noon, and night, because this dimension is inherent to our business.

What will be the major geopolitical trends of the 21st century?

It is very difficult to answer this question. Generally speaking, I believe that a large part of the analysis overestimates the power of ruptures and underestimates the long arc of history — such as the 70 years of continuous peace in Europe. Crises like Covid have not transformed the world, but have accelerated existing trends. There is no total break, but rather an accelerated continuity, where longstanding dynamics — power rivalries, control of flows, economic competition — are recomposing themselves within a more unstable environment. If one takes a little historical perspective, over the medium and long term, transformations are less radical than they are often thought to be.

I do believe, however, that European companies can play the role of an economic and civilisational model. European capitalism has its own singularity, distinguishing itself both from the shareholder-centred Anglo-Saxon model and from Chinese state capitalism. In this model, companies operate within a more regulated framework, integrating issues of sovereignty, sustainability, and territorial anchoring. This specificity may prove to be an asset in an international environment marked by instability and the search for more responsible models.

What reading would you recommend?

I would first recommend Raymond Aron, for his pragmatic and nuanced approach — particularly in the way he articulates power, interests, and uncertainty; one of the few rational, rather than passionate, anti-Gaullists. I also found The Labyrinth of the Lost by Amin Maalouf highly stimulating; it demonstrates how strategies that appear rational in order to differentiate from the West can lead, over the long term, to geopolitical dead ends and forms of strategic blindness. Finally, I would recommend Where We Come From by Géraldine Schwartz, which shows precisely how deeply rooted what unites us in Europe is, and how far it surpasses what divides us.